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1. Aims of paper 
The general aim of this paper is to present the implications of a corpus-based study of 
metaphors for communication in British English for the extrapolation of metaphorical 
‘source’ domains from linguistic data. Our specific aims are: 
1) to provide more evidence for the relevance and centrality of the notion of ‘scene’ (or 
‘scenario’) in the analysis of metaphorical patterns, as has been suggested by Grady (1997a) 
and Musolff (2004); 
2) to propose a distinction between different types of ‘scenes’, which would go some way 
towards explaining the relationship between Grady’s primary ‘scenes’ and Musolff’s more 
elaborate ‘scenarios’; 
4) to show how ‘scenes’ may stand in a variety of relationship to larger ‘domains’, and to 
reflect on the appropriateness of generalisations at different levels of conceptual abstraction 
in metaphor analysis. 
 
2. A brief overview of ‘source’ knowledge structures in Cognitive Metaphor Theory  
Cognitive Metaphor Theory (CMT) has traditionally explained the existence of 
conventional patterns of metaphorical expressions (e.g. I don’t know which way to turn, I 
am at a cross-roads in my life) as the linguistic realisation of conceptual metaphors, namely 
systematic correspondences across domains in conceptual structure (e.g. LIFE IS A JOURNEY). 
These correspondences are described as ‘mappings’ of structure, elements and relations 
from a ‘source’ domain (e.g. JOURNEY) to a ‘target’ domain (e.g. LIFE) (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980). The kinds of conceptual structures that may function as source domains include both 
highly abstract and skeletal ‘image-schemas’ (e.g. PATH or CONTAINER), and rich and 
complex knowledge structures, including a variety of objects, participants, actions, and 
relations (e.g. JOURNEY or WAR).   
 
More recently, however, some doubts have been cast on the possibility of properly 
accounting for observed patterns of metaphorical language use with reference to large and 
complex source domains such as JOURNEY, WAR, BUILDINGS, and so on. Grady (1997a, 
1997b,1998) reanalysed many of Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) examples in terms of 
‘primary metaphors’, namely simple, basic mappings that  have a strong experiential basis 
and motivate metaphorical expressions within a variety of different areas of experience (e.g. 
PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS or ASSISTANCE/HELP IS SUPPORT) (see also Lakoff and Johnson 
1999: 49ff.). Primary metaphor, Grady argues, can combine to produce ‘complex 
metaphors’, which correspond to the traditional conceptual metaphors of cognitive 
metaphor theory (e.g. the primary metaphors ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE and 
PERSISTING IS REMAINING ERECT combine to form the complex metaphor THEORIES ARE 
BUILDINGS (Grady 1997b)). Within Grady’s approach, the conceptual structures that 
function as ‘sources’ are ‘primary scenes’, namely ‘simple aspects or dimensions of 
subjective experience, not confined to any particular rich domain, but cross-cutting these 
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domains’ (Grady 1997a: 100). Primary scenes mainly reflect the basic physical experiences 
of childhood, such as swallowing an object or being physically close to somebody else. 
 
Kövecses (2002: 107ff.) provides a partly different account of the same kind of problems 
and phenomena. He points out that some source domains (such as JOURNEY and WAR) have 
a very wide metaphorical ‘scope’, i.e. they can function as metaphorical source domains for 
a wide variety of target domains (e.g. the BUILDINGS domains can be applied to THEORIES, 
RELATIONSHIPS, ECONOMIC SYSTEMS, and so on). Each source domain has a ‘major theme’ 
or ‘main meaning focus’, which is the conceptual material that is most centrally associated 
with it within a particular culture. This material is conventionally mapped onto a variety of 
target domains via the domain’s ‘central mappings’ (e.g. CONSTRUCTION IS BUILDING, 
ABSTRACT STRUCTURE IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE, and STABILITY/LASTINGNESS IS STRENGTH). 
These central mappings, Kövecses argues, correspond to what Grady calls primary 
metaphors (Kövecses 2002: 109-12). 
 
Musolff (2004) adopts Kövecses’s notions of main meaning focus and central mappings, 
but notices that the uses and rhetorical effects of metaphorical expressions in context can 
only be properly explained via an ‘intermediate analytical category between the level of the 
conceptual domain as a whole and its individual elements’ (Musolff 2004: 13). He calls this 
intermediate category ‘scenario’, namely ‘a minimal but coherent scene that is reminiscent 
of standard situations, which the users are familiar with as part of their shared cultural 
knowledge’ (Musolff 2004: 38). Scenarios, Musolff argues, ‘provide, as it were, the main 
story-lines or perspectives along which the central mappings are developed and extended’ 
(Musolff 2004: 18). Musolff (2004: 176) claims that scenarios are rooted in primary scenes, 
but does not pursue the nature of this relationship. What is clear from his examples is that 
scenarios are much more complex and context-specific knowledge structures than Grady’s 
primary metaphors, such as MARRIED PARTNERS and TRAIN JOURNEY.  
 
The analysis of our data supports the idea that the ‘scene’ or ‘scenario’ is a crucial level of 
conceptual structure in explaining general linguistic patterns, and specific uses and effects 
in context. We would also like to suggest that there are different types of scenes, including 
primary scenes and ‘non-primary’ scenes (such as Musolff’s scenarios), and that the latter 
may in some cases be regarded as domain-specific elaborations of the former. We will also 
show how different kinds of linguistic patterns require different generalisations beyond the 
level of the scene. 
 
3. The corpus 
Our corpus contains approximately 250,000 words of contemporary written British English 
(equally divided between fiction, press reports and (auto)biographies). As part of a previous 
project, the corpus has been tagged for categories of speech, writing and thought 
presentation (e.g. Direct Speech, Free Indirect Thought), giving us a pre-selected set of 
references to speaking, writing and thinking. Within the current project, we have examined 
approximately 5,000 references to spoken communication in the corpus, and classified 
approximately 20 per cent of these as metaphorical. Our analysis of these metaphorical 
expressions attempted to identify the relevant source ‘concept’ in each case, as well as to 
group ‘concepts’ under larger conceptual source structures (e.g. domains). Not surprisingly, 
this turned out to be a challenging task.  
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4. Types of source scenes in our data 
In analysing our data, we found that, in most cases, the kind of knowledge structure that 
most obviously functions as ‘source’ for individual expressions can be aptly described as a 
‘scene’, involving an action, the participant(s) involved in the action, and a goal. Scenes 
may vary, however, in how basic or generic they are, and also in how they might relate to 
larger knowledge structures, such as whole conceptual domains. 
 
4.1 Primary scenes in our data 
Some of the metaphorical references to communication in our data can be explained in 
terms of Grady’s primary metaphors. Consider the examples below:  
 
1. Last night Delors attacked Balladur’s idea of a “Europe of circles” in which each 
member country could progress at its own speed. (The Daily Telegraph, 12/12/1994) 
 
2. Yet six months earlier he supported the very same regime in a letter to a fellow MP. 
(Today, 5/12/1994) 
 
Example (1) can be seen as a linguistic realization of the primary metaphor 
OBJECTING/CRITICISING IS ATTACKING. Here the knowledge structure that functions as 
source is a primary scene where hostility leads to physical aggression, and the primary 
metaphor is grounded in ‘the correlation between negative evaluation of objects and the 
instinct to physically reject them, destroy them, etc.’ (Grady 1997a: 291). Example (2), on 
the other hand, can be explained in terms of the primary metaphor ASSISTANCE/HELP IS 
SUPPORT, which, according to Grady, relies on ‘the correlation between physical support 
and continued functionality’ (Grady 1997a: 283). This particular primary metaphor 
explains why support (both as a noun and as a verb) is used metaphorically in a wide 
variety of contexts to express the notion of help and assistance (e.g. financial support, 
moral support, technical support, etc.). 
 
As these examples show, primary metaphors account for metaphorical patterns across 
contexts or domains, and can explain the metaphorical uses of fairly general expressions 
such as attack and support. Many of the expressions in our data, however, could not easily 
be accounted for in the same way. 
 
4.2 Non-primary scenes as elaborations of primary scenes 
Our data contains many examples of expressions which appear to be related to examples 
such as (1) and (2), but which evoke much more complex, domain-specific scenes. 
Consider the example below: 
 
3. amid renewed backbench sniping at the Blair style of leadership (The Guardian, 
13/5/1996) 
 
The metaphorical use of sniping in reference to criticism can also be traced back to the 
primary metaphor OBJECTING/ CRITICISING IS ATTACKING. However, this only explains why 
sniping metaphorically expresses the notion of criticism, but does not explain why the use 
of this expression in this context suggests repeated and anonymous criticisms (in fact, this 
also applies to many of Grady’s own exemplifications of primary metaphors). The meaning 
of this expression can only be explained with reference to a non-primary SNIPING scene, 
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which is part of our knowledge of modern warfare. We suggest that the non-primary 
SNIPING scene has its basis in the primary ATTACK scene, but is derived from it via the kind 
of process that Lakoff and Turner (1989: 67-9) call ‘elaboration’:  in this case, the simple, 
basic, general scene of physical attack is elaborated into a richer, more specific and more 
complex scene involving a very specific kind of attack, where someone shoots at other 
people from a concealed place, typically using a gun. This particular type of attack evolved 
in the course of history as a result of the development of technology and strategy in warfare.   
 
In other words, while, as Grady has shown, primary metaphors can be combined to form 
complex metaphors, we propose that it is also possible to derive non-primary metaphors 
from primary ones via the elaboration of primary scenes within specific areas of experience 
or domains. At a cultural level, this is the result of the development of complex activities 
such as journeys and war from more basic activities such as purposeful movement and 
physical attack. At an individual level, more complex and context-specific knowledge 
structures develop from simpler, more basic structures as one’s experience of the world 
becomes more varied and sophisticated. It is important to notice that ‘combination’ and 
‘elaboration’ are two of the ways in which, according to Lakoff and Turner (1989), 
metaphorical novelty can be achieved. Novel metaphors, of course, can in their turn 
become conventional, as in the case of the use of sniping in relation to communication. In 
the case of this expression, it is also the case that the relevant non-primary scene is an 
example of the kind of knowledge structure that Musolff (2004) calls a ‘scenario’. Indeed, 
we suggest that many of Musolff’s scenarios are elaborations of primary scenes, although 
this will probably not apply in all cases.  
 
Our data contains several further metaphorical expressions that work in a similar way to 
sniping. Two examples are given below: 
 
4. Church leaders yesterday blasted a politically-correct bible (The Sun, 5/12/1994) 
 
5. British Gas has the worst image of any company after a year of soaring complaints 
and flak over fat cat pay. (The Daily Star, 13/5/1996) 
 
The metaphorical uses of blast and flak in relation to communication can be explained in 
terms of non-primary scenes that are elaborations of the primary ATTACK scene. In both 
cases, the elaboration is the result of the development of particular forms of armed attack 
that is typical of warfare. And, in both cases, the nature of the weaponry that is part of the 
non-primary source scene helps to explain the (conventional) metaphorical meanings of the 
expression: very strong criticism in the case of blast, and repeated and potentially abusive 
criticisms in the case of flak. 
Interestingly, Roger Schank’s (1982, 1999) model of ‘dynamic memory’ also includes 
‘scenes’ as the basic level of conceptual structure. Schank defines scenes as ‘general 
structures that describe how and where a particular set of actions take place’ (e.g. a 
WAITING ROOM scene) (Schank 1999: 113). According to Schank, scenes are combined to 
form larger structures, which he calls ‘Memory Organization Packets’, or MOPs (e.g. a 
PROFESSIONAL OFFICE VISIT MOP). Different versions of the same scene will be activated 
depending on the specific context (e.g. a visit to a dentist as opposed to an accountant). It 
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could be argued that MOPs correspond to the kinds of rich and complex domains that are 
normally discussed in Cognitive Metaphor Theory.  
In our case, scene such as SNIPING, BLASTING and FLAK are part of the larger domain of 
WAR(FARE), which, in Schank’s model, is a MOP which also organises many other scenes 
(e.g. GROUND ATTACK, AERIAL BOMBARDMENT, and so on). In the case of our examples, an 
analysis at the level of the underlying primary scene (OBJECTING/ CRITICISING IS ATTACKING) 
explains the experiential grounding of these metaphorical expressions; an analysis at the 
level of the relevant non-primary scenes explains the specific meanings of each expression; 
and an analysis at the level of the domain/MOP captures the fact that antagonistic 
communication is conventionally talked about via a range of different expressions that 
evoke scenes which are part of the larger domain/MOP of WAR (including, for example, 
‘bombarding with questions’, ‘stepped up his guerrilla warfare against’). This results in the 
kind of conceptual metaphor that is familiar in cognitive metaphor theory, such as 
ARGUMENT IS WAR (in fact, Semino (2005) argues that the most relevant source domain is 
PHYSICAL CONFLICT, of which WAR is a prominent part). 
 
This kind of analysis does not apply in all cases, however. In a number of cases, for 
example, a particular expression may evoke a particular scene, but there is insufficient 
linguistic evidence to make a generalisation at the level of the domain that the scene 
belongs to. Consider the example below: 
 
6. The US envoy, Charles Redman, is separately touring the region to bolster support 
for the new peace moves (The Independent, 5/12/1994) 
 
Here the expression bolster support is used metaphorically to refer to the attempt to 
increase others’ favourable opinions about something. The evoked non-primary scene 
(where an extra pillow is added to prop up someone in bed), can be seen as a very specific 
elaboration of the primary scene of SUPPORT, which functions as source in the primary 
metaphor ASSISTANCE/HELP IS SUPPORT (Grady 1997: 283). We have no evidence, however, 
that any other scenes from the larger domain of BED-MAKING provide expressions that are 
conventionally used metaphorically in relation to communication. So, here a generalisation 
at the level of domains would be inappropriate. 
 
4.3 Other types of  scenes: animal behaviour 
A number of metaphorical expressions in our data metaphorically describe human 
communication in terms of animal behaviour. Two examples are given below: 
 
7. “How much did you sell her, then?” Dennis butted in, thrusting his face forwards 
till it was only inches from the dealer’s. (Val McDermid, Dead Beat, 1992, p. 168) 
 
8. an excuse which no more convinced Claudie on that occasion than it did when 
parroted by me in later years (Peregrine Worsthorne, Tricks of Memory, 1993, p. 
125) 
 
Animal metaphors often require more complex explanations that we have space for here, 
since they tend to result from the culture-specific attribution of human valence to animal 
behaviours, and the subsequent metaphorical mapping of those behaviours back onto 
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human behaviour (e.g. see Kövecses 2002: 125). However, it seems clear to us that the 
metaphorical uses of these expressions can be explained in terms of scenes involving 
specific animal behaviours.  
 
The metaphorical use of butt in in the sense of an aggressive conversational interruption or 
intervention in (7) can be explained in terms of a scene where an animal hits or pushes 
against something or someone with its head or horns (the literal meaning of the expression 
is also relevant here, given the description of the character’s bodily movements). Strictly 
speaking, such a scene does not quite fulfil Grady’s criteria for primary scenes, but it is 
clearly more basic than scenes such as SNIPING or BLASTING. It may also be argued that the 
BUTTING scene is a specific elaboration of a more general COMPELLING FORCE scene, which, 
according to Grady, is involved in the primary metaphor COMPULSION IS A COMPELLING 
FORCE (e.g. My friends pushed me into volunteering). However, the argument seems less 
straightforward here than in the case of the examples discussed in the previous section.  
 
As far as example (8) is concerned, parroted is used metaphorically to indicate the 
mechanical repetition of words or ideas that one does not fully believe or understand. This 
expression can be explained in term of a scene where a stereotypical parrot imitates the 
sounds of words without necessarily understanding their meaning or communicative 
function. This kind of scene cannot easily be related to any of the primary scenes described 
by Grady, but is part of our stereotypical knowledge about a salient behaviour of a 
particular type of bird.  
 
Regardless of the status of these scenes to do with animal behaviour, we also need to 
consider the issue of what generalisations, if any, can be made on the basis of examples 
such as (7) and (8) (and others such as weasel words, ratting on someone, and so on). There 
is, we would argue, sufficient evidence to suggest that, at a general level, the domain of 
COMMUNICATION is partly constructed in terms of the general domain of ANIMAL 
BEHAVIOUR (cf. the discussion of PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS in Kövecses 2002: 124ff.). However, 
in this case the larger domain is not a MOP-like structure that acts as an organising frame 
for a number of scenes (such as WAR or PROFESSIONAL OFFICE VISIT). Rather, the ANIMAL 
BEHAVIOUR domain represents a superordinate category, whereas the animals prototypically 
involved in the evoked scenes correspond to basic-level categories (parrot, rat, weasel). 
This may explain why the metaphorical expressions that may be traced back to the ANIMAL 
BEHAVIOUR source domain appear to be less closely related to each other than those that 
can be traced back to the WAR source domain.2 Much more work still needs to be done on 
the nature of the generalisations about conceptual structures and mappings that can be made 
on the basis of linguistic patterns. 
 
4.4 Unrealistic scenes 
One of the common themes of metaphor theory generally is that metaphors rely on common, 
familiar experiences as vehicles/source domains. Grady (1997a) questions the claim that 
target concepts or domains tend to be distant and unfamiliar, but nevertheless emphasizes 
that, in primary metaphors, source scenes are part of our most basic and often earliest 
physical experiences. The analysis of our data partly questions these claims, since we have 
collected a number of expressions which evoke scenes that are not straightforwardly 
recognisable as part of our experience Consider the examples below: 
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9. “She really tore his head off and then gave him a long lecture about politeness …” 
(The News of the World, 28/4/1996) 
 
10. After Claudie had reluctantly and shamefacedly put him in the picture about 
Cardinal’s Wharf, he became really interested. (Peregrine Worsthorne, Tricks of 
Memory, 1993, p. 125) 
 
The metaphorical use of the expression tear someone’s head off in (9) can be traced back to 
the primary metaphor OBJECTING/CRITICISING IS ATTACKING. However, the specific 
meaning and connotations of the expression (to criticise someone very strongly and 
aggressively), can only be explained with reference to a particular elaboration of the scene 
which involves a particularly extreme kind of attack. Strictly speaking, however, a scene 
where someone tears somebody else’s off is rather unrealistic, both because it is physically 
implausible and because it is morally unacceptable. There are of course plenty of familiar 
scenes where the head or a body part of a human or animal is cut off, but we would argue 
that the hyperbolic effects of expressions such as these partly depends on the fact that the 
literal scene they evoke is rather extreme and unrealistic. 
 
Example (10) is different. No hyperbole is involved here, but it is nevertheless the case that 
the literal scene evoked by the expression put someone in the picture is implausible and 
unrealistic. In this case, the metaphorical meaning of informing someone about something 
could be explained as a combination of primary metaphors such as 
KNOWING/UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING  and COMPULSION IS A COMPELLING FORCE (Grady 
1997: 287, 296). However, it is also the case that we are able to construct imaginary, 
unrealistic situations, and use them for reasoning purposes: if someone was put in a picture, 
they would be able to see it very well; given the conventional conceptual metaphor 
KNOWING IS SEEING, a scene where someone is put in a picture can function as source for 
the communicative process where someone is informed about something.  
 
Given that imagining unrealistic, impossible and counterfactual situations is a central part 
of the cognitive activities of human beings (in fiction and elsewhere), it is not surprising 
that such situations may also function as metaphorical source scenes. In our examples, 
however, unrealistic source scenes can always be connected in some way to familiar 
scenarios and/or conceptual metaphors. This may not necessarily apply in all cases, 
however, especially with novel metaphorical expressions. 
 
5. Conclusions  
In summary, the preliminary analysis of our corpus data so far supports the idea that the 
‘scene’ is a crucial level of conceptual structure for metaphor analysis, where it is possible 
to explain the experiential grounding of expressions and their specific meanings and uses. 
However, we have shown that different types of scenes need to be postulated in order to 
explain different kinds of metaphorical expressions. These include: primary scenes as 
defined by Grady; non-primary scenes which may be derived from primary scenes via 
domain-specific elaboration (and which often correspond to Musolff’s scenarios); other 
types of scenes that are less easy to classify in these terms, including scenes that do not 
straightforwardly correspond to familiar experiences. We have also shown how the nature 
of the available linguistic evidence affects the kind of generalisations that may (or may not) 
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be made at the level of larger conceptual domains. Clearly, these can only be preliminary 




Goosens, L., Pauwels, P., Rudzka-Ostyn, B., Simon-Vandenbergen, A.-M. and Vanparys, J. 
(1995) By Word of Mouth: Metaphor, Metonymy and Linguistic Action in a 
Cognitive Perspective. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
Grady, J. (1997a) Foundations of meaning: primary metaphors and primary scenes. 
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of California, Berkeley. 
Grady, J. (1997b) ‘THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS revisited’, Cognitive Linguistics, 8, 4, 267-90. 
Grady, J. (1998) ‘The “Conduit” metaphor revisited: A reassessment of metaphors for 
communication’. In J-P. Koenig (ed.), Discourse and Cognition: Bridging the Gap 
(pp. 205-18). Stanford, CA.: CSLI Publications. 
Kövecses, Z. (2002). Metaphor: A Practical Introduction. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: Chicago University 
Press. 
Lakoff G. and Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its 
Challenge to Western Thought. New York: Basic Books. 
Lakoff, G. and Turner, M. (1989) More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic 
Metaphor. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 
Musolff, A. (2004) Metaphor and Political Discourse: Analogical Reasoning in Debates 
about Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Schank, R.C. (1982) Dynamic Memory: A Theory of Reminding and Learning in 
Computers and People. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Schank, R.C. (1999) Dynamic Memory Revisited. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Semino, E. (2005) ‘The metaphorical construction of complex domains: the case of speech 






  We are grateful to the British Academy for funding the project of which this study is part (grant LGR-
37225). 
2
 In fact, the problems posed by animal metaphors are even more complex than we have the space to show 
here. It would be possible, for example, to subsume the scenes they evoke under different domains, depending 
on whether they relate primarily to sound, body parts, physical aggression, and so on (see Goosens et al. 
1995). 
